We may wish to conclude that incumbents are fools, that it is irrational for them to spend so much energy and so many resources fighting for reelections that seem assured. Or we can consider the possibility that the conclusions we have drawn from our research are mistaken. I opt for the latter course. I shall show in this re search note that congressional incumbents are not invulnerable to 86 
electoral defeat, and do so without calling into question the valid ity of previous research on the electoral advantage of sitting House members.
Congressional Elections vs. Congressional Careers
What we know about the electoral success of incumbents comes mainly from taking election results and voter surveys dealing with one election at a time. It is true that ninety percent of congres sional incumbents seeking reelection win. It is true that an incum bent candidate will win five.percent more votes on average than does a non-incumbent fighting for an open seat. We may fairly conclude that, in any specific election, congressional incumbents are almost immune to electoral defeat. We cannot conclude, however, that incum bents are invulnerable, that, having once won a seat in the House, they are assured of being reelected as long as they wish.
The crucial distinction is between a congressional career and a congressional election. A career can only be built on a series of successfully contested congressional elections. Mayhew said:
It seems fair to characterize the modern Congress as an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers. The jobs offer good pay and high prestige. There is no want of applicants for them. Successful pursuit of a career requires con tinual reelection. (Mayhew, 1974b , pp. 14-15) Although a congressional career can only be sustained by "continual reelection," it can be hroken by one electoral defeat. Previous re search and commentary has neglected the career dimension that incum bents are concerned about; we have not examined series of elections. The rise of careerism in the House suggests that congressional invul nerability should be examined in a long-term perspective, rather than in the short-term view focusing on the upcoming election. Incumbents are most likely to win their next reelection fight. Whether they are likely to win all their reelection attempts is a completely different question.
A Longitudinal Perspective
Instead of looking at incumbent margins over challengers or at the differences in margins between challengers opposing incumbents and candidates for open seats, a career perspective forces us to exa mine series of elections. Whether a representative can forge a con gressional career for himself depends in part on his preferences (does he want to stay in the House?) and in part on his electoral strength (can he be reelected?). Clearly, incumbents running for reelection want to stay in the House for the succeeding session at least; the immediate reelection then depends on his electoral strength, which en compasses such factors as name recognition, level of media exposure, access to campaign funds, availability of the perquisites of office, and standing among voters, all factors which benefit incumbents over challengers.
The probability an incumbent will be reelected two times in a row is equal to the product of his reelection chances in his first and second attempts. (Obviously, only successful incumbents in the first attempt are around to contest the next election.) More generally, the probability that a representative will be reelected n times is the pro duct of the probabilities of his being reelected at t1 , t2 , t3. . .
tn -1 , and tn elections. Expressing the relationship in equation form:
where Pri represents the probability of continued reelection for an incumbent. Conversely, the probability of an incumbent being defeated before he is reelected n times is 1 -Pri. To determine the value of P we must evaluate pk , the probability of an incumbent's reelection in election k.
Because prediction is as difficult in political science as it is in other areas of life, and because my purpose here is to demonstrate that congressional incumbents in fact have not been invulnerable to defeat, I have chosen to define p, as the actual reelection rate for incumbents in previous elections. It may be argued that this defini tion forces us to treat all incumbents equally in their probability of reelection. Are not some incumbents stronger than others? What about differences between presidential and non-presidential years? Doesn't added seniority increase an incumbent's advantage?
For the purposes of this analysis, I have chosen to treat these factors as if they were held constant. A congressman looking to the future has no reason to assume that in the next five or six elections, for instance, he is more or less likely to be hurt by short-term par tisan forces, by changes in levels of turnout, or by unfavorable issues than any other congressman. He has no reason to assume that he is more likely to be hurt by changing district demographics, nor that he is more likely to face a well-financed and capable challenger than his colleagues will. For any one election, these conditions will not hold. But for a series of elections in the future, the only constant factor is the incumbency status of the congressman. And congressmen will not differ in that regard.
Results
Clearly, the probability of an incumbent being reelected at the next election, and the next election only (when k = 1), is high, in deed. This probability reflects the incumbent electoral advantage other researchers have established. When 1, however, the proba bility of continued reelection decreases.
Data for reelection rates of incumbents in the general election for the years 1964 through 1982 were compiled and are reported in sometime by 1982. The probabilities of reelection are still relative ly high, but they are not nearly so high as discussions of incumbency advantages would lead us to believe. The probabilities of reelection are in fact not so great as these figures suggest. The data are based on general election success rates alone, but a number of incumbents succumb to primary election challen gers. We can redefine p, as the success rate for incumbents in both primary and general elections and recompute values for P ., reported in Table 2 . The values are not much lower, an average oFVoie, but the decrease is enough to reduce P . substantially. Taking the prob ability of primary loss into accouni increases the likelihood of in cumbents losing their seats by about eight percent over a period of six to ten elections. And of course the incumbency advantage for the party holding the seat disappears in the general election if the con gressman loses his .renomination bid.
This analysis is based on electoral vulnerability demonstrated at the polls, but the vulnerability of some incumbents may never show up in an election because they choose not to run. Jacobson and Kernel 1 label decisions not to run in the face of electoral defeat "strategic retirements" (Jacobson and Kernel 1, 1981). Clearly, these estimates of reelection probabilities are higher than they should be, because they do not reflect decisions not to seek reelection in the face of adverse electoral circumstances. Unfortunately, reliable data on the 
Conclusion
Congressional incumbents are formidable electoral opponents, as reflected both by the rate at which they successfully win reelection and by the margins with which they win. To have established the fact of that electoral advantage and to go on to studies which try to ac count for that edge is to make substantial progress in the study of congressional elections. However, both the activities of incumbents and the never-ending stream of challengers for their seats indicate that the electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents may be exaggerated.
The data presented here argue clearly that, at least during the 1964-1982 period, incumbent success rates are not equivalent to incum bent invulnerability. Incumbents are quite likely to face defeat over the course of a congressional, career. Even though the results of studies of congressional elections are correct about the value of incumbency in a single election, one cannot generalize too broadly and suggest that it bestows electoral security to incumbents.
